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The neo-Kantian apriorism of Mises and the Aristotelian apriorism of Rothbard
hold that economic science can be entirely built on what Rothbard (1957) called the
axiom of action. This axiom is a true a priori. This means that the starting point of
economic science does not have to be tested. It is enough to use deductive reasoning
to produce discursive knowledge. This position escapes positivism (Lachmann 1982,
p. 36) and fights it. It is also a nonskeptical (Hoppe 1991, p. 245) and dogmatic
vision of economic science. It ensures that human action is understandable.
To justify this position, the Austrian school points out empiricism's weaknesses.
The assertion according to which nothing can be known without an experimental
proof is baseless; it is founded on a branch of metaphysics (Mises 1962, p. vi). It is
obvious that any attempt to deny the principle that man acts would be self-
contradictory, since the denial itself is an action (Hoppe 1991). To deny the axiom of
action is implicitly to admit its truth. Kirzner (1976) employs Mises's introspection
argument to defend apriorism:
What we know about our own actions and about those of other people is
conditioned by our familiarity with the category of action that we owe to a
process of self-examination and introspection as well as understanding of other
peoples' conduct. (Mises 1962, p. 71)
The economist is a man. He has, in this sense, a mind that is structured in the
same manner as all other men. Under these conditions it is impossible that what is
deductively certain for him should not be certain for others (Hoppe 1995, p. 19).
Contrary to the natural sciences, the economist is not in the situation of an
extraterrestrial who, by observing the Earth, might note that there is a perpetual
motion between squares (cars) and points (men), the squares absorbing and rejecting
the points according to a given periodicity. The economist knows immediately that
Francois Facchini is an associate researcher at the University of Paris 1, CES-MATISSE (France).
F. Facchini (IS!)
Maitre de Conferences, Universite de Reims, Champagne Ardennes, France
e-mail: facchini@univ-parisl.fr
^ Springer
Quart J Austrian Econ (2007) 10:234-249 235
they are cars and men (Kirzner 1976, pp. 45^46). For this reason the economist is
not in the same situation as the physicist. He knows his object of study from the
inside. For this reason, he does not have to test the assumption of an action's
intentionality. To explain social phenomena such as currency, prices, or trade, he
can appeal to his own reason and intentions to know why other men act in a
certain way. From this point of view man can have an a priori knowledge of what
exists independent of all the formulations of the mind because certain structures
of the world have in them a degree of intelligibility. The conscious subject and
the objects of knowledge are, to a degree, predestined for one another. Therefore
an a priori knowledge of reality is possible. If this proposal is debatable for
natural sciences, it is perfectly acceptable for social sciences. Price, currency,
exchange, the state, etc., are formed by the human mind. They are in one way or
another its creation.
All these arguments forget the unintended consequences of human action. They
provide a basis for a simple kind of methodological individualism but they have each
given way to many debates and controversies. The use of introspection in particular
was the object of an epistemological schism in the contemporary Austrian-American
School. The story of the Martian researcher, proposed by Kirzner, is based on
introspective self-evidence. The self-evidence of introspection, however, does not
befit everyone. If it is a more or less elaborate form of empathy (Koppl 1994a,
p. 72), as Weber maintains, the knowledge that results from it will likely be
inductive, singular, and dependent on each individual's personal history. If it is
singular, it will not have the status of scientific knowledge (Aron 1987, p. 126),
which requires repeated tests. This requirement, however, faces the traditional
problems of induction (Witt 1990, p. 56). In practice it is impossible to know how
many cases one needs to observe to accept the hypotheses of the original
introspection. If it is historical, the question of self-evidence changes with our
self-perception. Not one immutable law would then be possible. Knowledge of these
phenomena would be limited to a form of historical understanding.
The criticism of introspection thus finds the two pillars of Methodenstreit, i.e., the
role of induction, and the historicity mental categories. The hermeneutic turn, then,
is the proposal to return to the interpretive sociology of Max Weber, and to
reinterpret introspection in terms of ideal type. It is a question of defining the
conditions under which a particular act of introspection can lead to general
knowledge. The construction of the ideal type is only one stage in the search for
truth, since the act of interpretation built on the ideal type is always historically
relative (Raynaud 1996, pp. 50 and 45). True a priori knowledge gradually gives
way to a true interpretative knowledge relative to the ideality or the historicity of the
ideal type. By criticizing Kirzner's introspective defense, the interpretive turn also
seeks to reestablish apriorism on Weberian foundations. It risks approaching the
positions of the German Historical School, even if—as with Alfred Schiitz—its
ambition is to establish a place for universal knowledge. This article attempts (1) to
highlight the reasons for this historicist drift and (2) to show that realism is the most
capable philosophy on which to found a priori knowledge and reconcile the
historicity of the categories of action (their becoming) with their immutability
{being).
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The Interpretive Turn and the Historicity of the Ideal Type Homo Oeconomicus
Part of the Austrian-American School uses the Weberian critique and posits that the
old Austrian account of understanding fell into the same romantic-intuitionist trap as
its archenemy, historicism. The solution is to mobilize the concept of ideal type to
save apriorism. The act of interpretation is "not achieved through a special faculty of
intuition that allows us to obtain knowledge by entering into the life stream of
another person" (Koppl 1994a, p. 72). This Weberian critique bases its interpretation
and the new definition of the axiom of action on an ideal type. The discussion is
centered in the nature of this ideal type, in other words, in the different concepts of
human knowledge. For this reason, the discussion on ideal type is a pure discussion
about philosophy of knowledge where Thomas Aquinas has his place because,
contrary to the neo-Kantian perspective, he does not build barriers between the mind
and reality (Maritain 1924, p. 33). Nevertheless, Thomas Aquinas's contribution has
been forgotten by the Kantian tradition of modern philosophy of knowledge. The
Weberian perspective makes the same mistake.
Weber's Concrete Ideal Type
Weberian epistemology (Weber 1968) is based on Kantian categories and the
opposition between the formal description of reality (ideal type) and observation.
The aim of Weberian sociology is
to interpret the actions of individuals in the social world and the way in which
individuals give meaning to social phenomena. But to attain this aim, it does not
suffice either to observe the behavior of groups of single individuals, as a crude
empiricism would have us believe. Rather the special aim of sociology demands a
special method in order to select the materials relevant to the peculiar questions it
raises. This selection is made possible through the formulation of certain
theoretical constructs known as "ideal types." (Schiitz 1967, pp. 6-7)
Ideal type is, therefore, a means of escaping the romantic-intuitionist definition of
introspection and of introducing logic in Verstehen.
Weber defines ideal type as a tableau of different thoughts that exists only in its
purely conceptual form. It is an instrument through which the economist can
compare a fact to an ideal and thereby understand the ways in which actual action is
influenced by irrational factors of all sorts. The rational ideal type is an authentic
generalized theoretical concept based on value judgments and is defined as a Utopia
obtained by analytically accentuating certain elements of reality that one never
encounters empirically (Raynaud 1996, p. 49). Like Utopia, the ideal type does not
teach anything about the world. Through the ideal type, the economist constructs
imaginary causes that allow us to untangle real causal relationships to improve our
interpretation of historical events. It is a formal model that remains fixed in an ever-
changing world. It is a means to introduce unity into a world of diversity. "Ideal
types cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. ... Weber says about an ideal
typical concept that it 'is not a description of reality' ... [but] is a conceptual
construct which is neither historical reality nor even a 'true' reality" (Maki 1997,
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p. 483). Therefore, the construction of an ideal type is not an end in itself, but a
means to understanding (Weber 1968, p. 90).
To this extent, it is unscientific to put forward norms of action based solely on a
deductive model (Weber 1968, p. 92). Seeking to reduce economic science to a
simple deductive exercise renders the economist wary of exercising criticism and
constantly focused on the past. The need to confront the ideal type with reality
enables Max Weber to criticize the speculative theories of history directly. "The
significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this
significance cannot, however, be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of
analytical laws" (Weber 1968, p. 76).
It is because ideal types are artificially invariant that human sciences will continue
to renew themselves as they will always be confronted with a flow of new problems
(Weber 1968, p. 105). A system of analytical laws has only a heuristic value. No
single scientific explanation is eternal, as the future constantly sheds light on the
past, thus modifying the understanding of history (Weber 1992, pp. 105, 242).
Progress in the cultural sciences is therefore to be found in interpretations of the past
as new facts come to light, facts unknown to the original actors of the historical
events in question. The truth of human sciences is no longer a temporal truth but a
truth located within a chain of representations (Weber 1992, pp. 214 and 199). The
economist looks at the world objectively; he debates on the basis of clearly defined
value judgments and validates procedures that force him to confront these concepts
(ideal types) with precise observations. The scientific attitude consists in the
abandonment of the illusion of an axiologically neutral approach and the attainment
of perfect knowledge.
Weberianism then explains the epistemological evolution of the Austrian-
American School because of its equivocal conception of ideal type.1 It is a logical
Utopia and a historical type used as an instrument by economists for comparative
reasons. But being a Utopia, it lacks sufficient historical background. As a type, it is
useless for building an a priori economic theory. Schutz (1967, pp. 241-247) agrees
with Mises on this last point and turns to Husserl to give an atemporal and universal
level to the axiom of action. Lavoie's perspective is a logical consequence of
Schutz's solution because he uses Heidegger and Gadamer against Husserl. Schutz's
solution to the riddle of the meeting between reality and the a priori necessary to
thought explains why social phenomenology finds a solution in hermeneutic "lived
experience" (Schutz). In fine, the Austrian-American School does not oppose history
and economic theory because the act of interpretation is historically and culturally
situated (Lavoie 1994, p. 60). This part of the Austrian-American School agrees with
the German Historical School (Mises 1962, p. 77; Selgin 1987) in rejecting the
possibility of attaining a universal and atemporal truth.
Eidetic Schiitzian Ideal Type
The social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz (1967) attempts to preserve Austrian
aphorism in a Weberian perspective.
'Schiitz (1967, p. 244) maintains that the Weberian concept of ideal type is ambivalent, that it is not just a
historical concept.
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Schiitz dehistoricizes "Weber by eliminating value relevance as a principle of
concept formation in the social sciences and salvages the a priori character of
economics by formalizing its basic concepts and premises" (Prendergast 1986,
p. 19). He rejects historicism's attempt to base economics on statistical concepts
derived from observed variations in existing economic systems (Prendergast 1986,
p. 13). He does not use the historical aspect of the ideal type and reconciles Mises
and Weber via Husserl. For him the ideal type is a means to describe the a priori
concepts of pure law in economics (Prendergast 1986, p. 15). Ideal types are neither
a Utopia, nor a singular experience.
Ideal types are constructed by postulating certain motives as fixed and invariant
within the range of variation of the actual self-interpretation in which the Ego
interprets its own action as it acts. To be sure, this postulation of certain motives
as invariant does refer back to previous "experience" (Efahrung). But this is not
the experience of shallow empiricism. It is rather the immediate prepredicative
encounter which we have with any direct object of intuitions (Husserl). The ideal
types may, therefore, be derived from many kinds of "experiences" and by means
of more than one kind of constituting process. Both "empirical" and eidetic ideal
types may be constructed. By empirical we mean "derived from the senses," and
by eidetic we mean "derived from essential insight." (Schiitz 1967, p. 244)
Therefore, ideal types have universal validity. They do not refer to any individual
or spatial-temporal collection of individuals. They do not just mean a person who is
expressing or has expressed himself in a certain way; they are also a sign of the
expressive process (Schiitz 1967, p. 187). Homo agens of Misesian praxeology and
Homo oeconomicus of price theory are ideal types. They are ideal types of the
highest "anonymity" (Schiitz 1967, pp. 241-42) and will be of very little use for the
analysis of any specific decision because they are completely empty of historical
references (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2001, p. 135). Homo oeconomicus is not a real person,
but "only a shadow person" (Schiitz 1967, p. 190; emphasis added). He is the result
of the process of ideal type construction where subjective meaning-contexts that can
be directly experienced are successively replaced by a series of objective meaning-
contexts. Homo oeconomicus is a means to have an objective meaning context. It is
for this reason that it obtains the highest "anonymity" and creates the basic concepts
of the deductive disciplines. Anonymity maintains the universal validity of the
axiom of action and abstract law in economics.
Schutz thus reconciles history and economic theory (1967, p. 212). "No doubt
Mises's criticism is valid against Weber's earliest formulations of the concept of
ideal type" (Schutz 1967, p. 243). But Mises is wrong when he rejects anonymous
ideal types as a means to translate the subjective meaning-contexts into the objective
meaning-context of scientific knowledge (Schutz 1967, p. 246). Nevertheless,
anonymity is not at the base of the objectivity of ideal type, but rather of the
objectivity of Verstehen. The ultimate basis of ideal type objectivity is the schemes
of experience. These schemes "consist of material that has already been organized
under categories. ... Schemes of experience are interpretive schemes" (Schutz 1967,
p. 84). These schemes organize lived experience in "a synthesis of recognition"
(Schutz 1967, p. 83; emphasis added). The schemes of experience preorganize our
experience and are based upon lived experience (Isambert 1989, p. 308). Human
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behavior is thus already meaningful and intelligible. Language explains this as it
instills in the human mind schemes of experience and explains in fine anonymity and
the "ideality" of subjective experience (Schutz and Luckman 1973, p. 233).
Language makes it possible for different types to be intersubjective; it makes
possible a generalization of these types because it is the principal meaning-context
(Sinnzusammenhang) of the human mind.
The phenomenological turn initiated by Schutz explains why the Austrian-
American School dismissed the naive rationalism that tried to deduce all knowledge
by only one axiom and to develop a transcendental rationalism, whereas interpretive
sociology is based on a series of tacit presuppositions (Brehier 1994, p. 1012).
Eidetic ideal types are invariant and have an autonomy vis-a-vis experiences, but
they can only exist in the purposeful act of observation. Schutz does not succeed in
breaking with the equivocation of Weberian ideal types because of his own
contradictions. If he bases the objective meaning of action upon a pre-phenomenal
and logical plan, he forgets lived experience and life itself. If he bases the objective
meaning of action upon intersubjectivity, he bases the ideal type in transcendental
terms (Isambert 1989, p. 316). In this scenario, Husserl's philosophy is useless
because his goal was to grasp essences outside of their concrete context and to
exclude the spatial, temporal, and social environment of Verstehen (Jeanrond 1995,
p. 85).2 The fate of eidetic ideal types is to be surpassed by historical hermeneutic
economic ideal types defined by Gadamer and initiated by Don Lavoie.
Historical Ideal Type and Hermeneutics
Lavoie follows this road. He radicalized the historicity of Verstehen and developed a
hermeneutic reading of the Misesian dichotomy between theory and history (Lavoie
1986, p. 195). Lavoie (1986, p. 196) argues that Mises's apriorism has been too easily
dismissed for its Euclidean vices without any recognition of its hermeneutic virtues.
Euclideanism and hermeneutics are two contrasting views of the relationship
between methodology and science. ... Euclideanism is a more prescriptive
methodology while hermeneutics is a more descriptive one. Euclideanism is
represented as a fixed deductive structure. ... Hermeneutics is rather a network
model. (Lavoie 1986, p. 197)
Text interpretation is the prototype of Verstehen but the most important moment is
not when the reader conceptualizes his anonymous ideal type. This is because at the
beginning of this act of understanding there is the presupposition or prejudgment
that makes understanding possible (Rector 1990, p. 216). "These prejudgements are
essential inputs to the process of forming true beliefs. They include the tacit
assumptions that lie behind the way we frame problems and ask questions" (Rector
1990, p. 216). Prejudgments make up common sense and persuasive argumentation,
and are based on a linguistic community. In this way, Verstehen is an act. What is
important is to understand this act and to describe the hermeneutic circle. Verstehen
2See also Gadamer (1987, pp. 105-46).
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participates in the development of meaning: a fact has a meaning because it is
understood as having a meaning. The ultimate end of understanding is not to grasp
the purpose of an action, but to come to agree with it—in other words, to understand
in one's own context the actions of others (Jeanrond 1995, p. 93).
From this perspective, the ideal type Homo oeconomicus accurately translates the
prejudgment of observers. It offers greater objectivity because it exposes a particular
vision of the world and creates a new event.
The interpretive critique of Austrian objectivism focuses on the "getting at"
process itself, and argues that understanding is not a merely reproductive, but rather
a creative, productive process. Hermeneutics argues that economics (and science in
general) does not supply us with an objective reproduction of economic reality as it
is in itself, it creatively produces an interpretation from a particular perspective
(Lavoie 1994, p. 59). A good understanding implies that one does not passively
receive the text's or the event's message, but rather appropriates that message for
oneself. "It is only understood through the active participation of interpreters"
(Lavoie 1990, p. 2; Prychitko 1994, p. 308). Ideal type is not an exterior referent. It
is both prejudgment and the freedom to believe. The economist (observer) is
persuasive because he is in agreement with the prejudgment of his audience, and not
because he described the reality or the true purpose of action. Ideal type becomes an
instrument for knowing the prejudgment of actors situated in time and space. The
question is not whether the axiom of action represents the world as it is (because
reality is ontologically perceived). Reality is perceived as rational because it is
experienced that way. The axiom of action is a prejudgment that exists prior to
understanding. It is because the observer perceives a rational human order that he
understands it in this way.
The return to a Weberian analysis has three consequences. It breaks the continuity
between the old and the modern Austrian schools. It accepts a part of the German
Historical School thesis (Koppl 1994b, p. 297), and it defines economic science as
an interpretive science and not as a social ontology.
Austrian economics emerged in rebellion against skepticism ... that rejected the
idea of an economic science devoted to the explanation of market phenomena
in terms of exact and universal laws. ... Today, Austrian economics is
challenged by skepticism once again. (Selgin 1987, pp. 19-20)
The interpretive turn then leads to qualifying the truth as relative, nonuniversal,
equivocal, and temporal, and the category of mind as historical (Lavoie 1994, p. 60).
The hermeneutic perspective radicalizes the Weberian analysis to define human
knowledge as concrete and ever-changing depending on the prejudgments on time
and space. "The harmony of all the details with the whole is the criterion of correct
understanding" (Rector 1990, p. 220). In that regard, knowledge is relative to the
context in which it is being interpreted and the experience of each individual to
interpret that specific event.
Lachmann (1976) used this theory of knowledge in his own theory of human
coordination. "In our kaleidic society the obsolescence of old knowledge is a fact of
fundamental importance" (Lachmann 1978, p. 7). Knowledge is always affected by
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the passing of time. In such a world, it would appear difficult for the individual to
coordinate his plans (Lachmann 1976, p. 131). In line with Bergson's criticism, he
argues that reality is in continuous movement. Man is nothing. Hence, intelligence
via ideas cannot apprehend what is real because its job is to define, to distinguish,
and to immobilize things within a concept. Human knowledge is useless because it is
only aware of past events that will not be reproduced; it is imperfect because it offers
temporal knowledge of a world in perpetual motion. The individual is reduced to
knowing the future via his imagination. Lachmann and the Austrian-American
School doubt that humans are capable of anticipating and coordinating. They
maintain that action (entrepreneurship) is always a cause of a lack of coordination
and focus instead on the role of institutions (artificially invariant) in the coordination
process (Lachmann 1971).
The use of introspection under the control of an ideal type historicized economic
science and cast doubt on the capacity of the human mind to know an always-
changing world. It does not answer, in this sense, criticisms addressed to the
romantic definition of introspection. Interpretive knowledge is not singular, but it is
only valid for the group that shares the same interpretation. It is not immutable since
it is historical. It is not general since it is shared only by one group. The hermeneutic
solution thus fails to achieve the objective of the Austrian School at the time of
Methodenstreit.
To give historical coherence to the Austrian School, we propose a Thomist or
realist solution. This solution is not original. It has been proposed by Rothbard
(1957)3 and has since been developed by Uskali Maki. The originality lies in the
way in which we tackle the problem via introspection and in the consequences we
draw for the practice of economic science.
Thomas Aquinas's Realism and Social Ontology
The realist philosophy of knowledge generally argues that truth is neither identical to
the objectivity of thought nor to the objectivity of understanding. Truth is one,
immutable, and universal.
First, truth is one. "Contradictions cannot be true at the same time" (Aquinas
1961, p. 247).
Second, truth is immutable (unchangeable). "Not that truth itself is the subject of
change, but that our intellect changes from truth to falsehoods; in that sense, forms
may be said to be changeable" (Aquinas 1964, 1.16.8).
3Rothbard (1957, p. 318):
Professor Mises, in the neo-Kantian tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a
categorical truth a priori to all experience. My own epistemological position rests on Aristotle and
St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence I would consider the axiom a law of reality rather than a law
of thought, and hence "empirical" rather than "a priori." But it should be obvious that this type of
"empiricism" is so out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a
priori for present purposes.
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Third, truth is a linkage between mind and being.
Truth is in its primary significance, in the intellect. Now, since a thing is true as
having the form proper to its own nature, it must follow that the mind, in the act
of knowing, is true as having the likeness of the thing known, which form is the
intellect in the act of knowing. Accordingly truth is defined as conformity
between intellect and thing. ... When the intellect judges that the thing
corresponds to the form of the thing which it apprehends, then for the first time
it knows and affirms truth. (Aquinas 1964, 1.16.2)
But truth and being are not convertible terms.
Plato's opinion was false because he believed that the mode of being which the
thing known has in reality is the same as the one which it has in the act of being
known. ... It is not necessary that a form should have the same mode of being
in the intellect that it has in the thing known. (Aquinas 1961, p. 65)
The mind is not passive; it abstracts the intelligible in things, as it does in the act of
joining or separating concepts in judgment.
Intelligence through abstraction attains the essence of things but not their
existence. "The truth is the conformity of the action of the mind uniting two
concepts in one judgment with the existence (present or possible) of one and the
same thing in which these two concepts come into being" (Maritain 1924, p. 25).4
Man attains the truth via judgment, which is the only discourse capable of being true
or false.
The debate on introspection takes, then, a new departure. It does not deny,
however, Schutz's contribution, which sought to solve (via Husserl and the ideal
type) the enigma of the intersection of the a priori and the transcendental.
Introspection does concern induction, but not Baconian induction. For this reason,
it is not affected by criticisms of the contemporary epistemology of induction. It is
possible, then, to conceive the existence of true knowledge produced by an act of
introspection or by qualitative induction ("Qualitative Induction and Introspection"
section). On this basis, one can then rebuild a true economic science, in the Thomist
sense ("Judgment and the Axiom of Action" section), which reconciles the mutable
and immutable ("Social Ontology and Evolution" section) and thus answers
Lachman's theses.
Qualitative Induction and Introspection
The realistic reinterpretation of the problem of introspection is based on the theory of
essence. Judgment combines two essences. Thomism defines introspection through
the problem of knowledge in terms of universals (Maki 1997, p. 478). If the human
mind can grasp the essence of money, price, exchange, or action, it is not necessary to
generalize. Being is the one thing that is common to all things. In each thing—action,
exchange, price, money, etc.—we can discover the nature of being, in other words, that
which never changes. Human knowledge is, for this reason, founded on the identity
4A11 translations of Maritain are my own.
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principle. Realist philosophy asks after the objectivity of mental concepts (Verneaux
1959, p. 144) and about the relations that universal judgments maintain.
The Thomist solution argues that the human mind discovers that it is universal in
the "things" mentioned above. It defines qualitative induction as a form of
abstraction. "Abstraction is the means by which intelligence can identify itself
immaterially vis-a-vis an object yet remain independent of that object" (Maritain
1924, p. 109). In introspection, the human mind becomes one with the object. In
abstraction, the human mind becomes the object (as other). It does not know its
particular and concrete existence but "detaches itself from its own existence to attract
something into itself and thus know it from within itself (Maritain 1924, p. 125).
The human mind has, in this perspective, the biological ability to exclude the
singularity of each existence and to grasp what is universal. Abstraction reveals an
unknown wealth, just as a fisherman catches a rare fish in the sea (Daujat 1974,
p. 142). He reels in the fish without having been aware of its existence, just as
abstraction is able to bring to light the intelligible essence within things. Thomas
Aquinas distinguishes three degrees of abstraction.
• The formal object5 of the first degree of abstraction (experimental science) is the
sensible. It is the study of the universal nature of physical and sensory phenomena.
It abstracts the essence of movement, pressure, light, sound, heat, life, etc.
• The formal object of the second degree of abstraction (mathematics) is quantity. It
is the study of the universal nature of things from their quantitative angle. It abstracts
the essence of things by using the mathematical relations between quantities.
• The formal object of the third degree of abstraction is being as being. It abstracts the
essence of being not in its sensory or quantitative form, but ontologically—reality as
it really is. It is the highest degree of abstraction and is based on simple observations
requiring neither equipment nor technique but only common experience (being,
change, diversity, etc.). The aim of social ontology is "being as being" and not the
sensible or measurable side of reality.
Knowledge is a process where the human mind has a creative role in discovery.
Contrary to the inductive method, human knowledge is not a process of
impoverishment (Moreau 1976, p. 59) or an attempt to reduce things to the
measurable (p. 135). The abstraction of essence lays the foundation for the ability to
discover the universality hidden in things.
The universal is not a form of a priori knowledge, and intelligence alone will not
produce universal truths. The development of ideas is an activity of the mind, which
discovers that which is intelligible from the data of experience via the senses.
Abstraction must not be confused with Baconian induction (Philippe 1991, pp. 56
and 186), which focuses its attention on statistical regularities: what is true is normal;
what is normal is regular. The human mind classifies similar objects together and
5To grasp the idea of a formal object, we must remember that hearing, for instance, only knows things via
the sound they make upon the ears. An object emitting no sound or whose sound does not reach the ears
can in no way be known by our hearing. The object of hearing is formal as hearing only explores one of its
sensory qualities. In the same way, the object of mathematics is formal as it only explores its quantitative
dimension.
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generalizes. Human knowledge is a generalization. Baconian induction, however, is
not complete because (1) it is not possible to classify sensations without a hypothesis
concerning the manner in which they are related to one another, (2) it is impossible
to found induction on itself, that is, without resorting to universal propositions that
depend on induction (Popper 1968, p. 25), and (3) it is impossible to say how many
observations are necessary to make a fact normal or regular. The normal becomes,
under these conditions, arbitrary. Qualitative induction, on the contrary, does not
need to account for all the facts in order to create a universal judgment. The human
mind discovers the essence in the singular, which is not necessarily a generalization.
"It suffices, for example, to see a pie cut into several pieces to understand what is
a whole, a part of this whole, and to understand the necessity of the principle that the
whole is bigger than its parts" (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book 1, Part 30, cited
in Verneaux 1959, p. 172; my translation).
Induction and generalization should not be confused. Qualitative induction is an
intuition and intuition is a form of abstraction. Thus, qualitative induction is neither
an effective form of introspection (because the human mind does not know the
reality of its existence and singularity) nor is it a generalization. Intelligence through
abstraction attains the essence of things, but not their existence (Maritain 1924). It
captures reality, but still does not know what it is. It says we are speaking of a dog,
but does not know exactly what this dog is (Philippe 1990, p. 13) because it abstracts
the dog in its spiritual being. Hence, abstraction remains a very imperfect mode of
knowledge because it allows the particularities of things to escape (Verneaux 1959,
p. 155). It is judgment that reduces the gap between essence and existence (Daujat
1974, p. 50).
Judgment and the Axiom of Action
Judgment has a double function. First, it combines essences. Second, it makes
intelligence conform to reality. "Judgment is the act via which intelligence is bound
to what is real" (Verneaux 1959, p. 158). The law of demand, for instance, does not
exist outside the instantaneity of the two universals of price and demand. It is a real
aspect of the specific relations between specific prices and demands. Exact laws as
relations between universals take the form N(F,G) where F and G are the universals
and N is the relation between F and G. They expose the necessary relationships
between F and G (Maki 1997, p. 487).
The pure theory of action is not based on a romantic-intuitionist form of
introspection or Baconian induction (enumeration), but on the capability of the
human mind to capture the universal. The economist does not need to observe every
man to know that men are intelligent. A sole case is sufficient for him to create a
universal judgment on the condition that he can discern within this single case its
essence or law (Verneaux 1959, p. 172). The universal goes beyond all the particular
cases known through experience. It is valid for all beings that possess this essence.
Nobody, when answering the question "What is a man?" will reply that it is a thing
with two arms, a head, etc. One answers by defining the essence of man, saying that
man is a being endowed with intelligence. It is not that the axiom of action is true
because one has observed many men, but because the mind immediately apprehends
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the essence of things. Introspection should not be defined as a generalization
(induction in the sense of Hume) but as a qualitative induction (induction in the
sense of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas), which creates the semantic intersubjectivity
(Simon 1944, p. 8) of the a priori sciences (as opposed to the pragmatic
intersubjectivity of the positive sciences). It is incorrect to maintain that only
pragmatic judgments are liable to produce knowledge. A thinker, even if he has not
been able to observe every man on earth, can express a universal judgment of the
type "man is free" or "man is intelligent" by virtue of the qualities of abstraction of
his intelligence. His judgment is true because he can conceive the subject, man, in
such a way as to perceive the predicate that is universally appropriate, is free. This
type of judgment can be affirmed through experience. He says what must be by
virtue of the very nature of things. This is a semantic judgment. Economic theory is
therefore a general knowledge of the universals of economics that has no need to
resort to observation because it is founded on evident first principles and deductive
reasoning that, if used correctly, will lead the economist to the correct results.
Realism thus leads us to distinguish between two types of judgment.
• Semantic judgments (jugement inter subjectif de droit) are a priori and make
available certain knowledge about the essence of price, money, action, production,
work, needs, market, etc. They can claim a semantic intersubjectivity.
• Pragmatic judgments {jugement inter sub j ectif de fait) are a posteriori and always
more uncertain, for they are confronted with the accidental and with the
problems of Baconian induction (Hume's critique). They claim a pragmatic
intersubj ectivity.
Thomism legitimizes semantic judgment and defines economic science as a social
ontology. "We may specify that theoretical economics represents economic
universals as real objects" (Maki 1990, p. 296) or as social ontology that does not
deny the need for a positive science expressing pragmatic judgments. On this basis,
social ontology can justify its objective of proposing exact laws; in other words,
defining the relations between universals. "The simple idea will be that exact
economic laws in Menger's sense are best understood as relations between economic
universals" (Maki 1997, p. 487).
This ontological knowledge of universal economics does not suffice because
knowledge of the essences is not the same as knowledge of concrete realities (that is,
the difference between essence and existence). Economic science must descend to
the level of existence. By exploring the singularity of each particular act or fact one
moves away from universals and develops experimental work. When a thinker
expresses a singular judgment such as this man is black he must necessarily observe
this man to evidence the fact that the attribute black, which is of an accidental nature,
corresponds to the man in question. The further the economist enters into the
singularity of facts, the more uncertain his knowledge becomes, for he moves away
from the certainty of that which is immediately evident. He knows man through the
idea of man, and black through the idea of black. A pragmatic judgment of the type
this man is black concerns only one characteristic of this man. This characteristic
relates to the fact that he is black like any other black man, but is nevertheless not
the same. The unknowable is always present in a concrete being (Daujat 1974,
p. 222). The concrete being remains a mystery for objective knowledge. The further
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the economist moves away from first principles and sense data, the more he is
subjected to the contingency of human decisions and their mystery. Objective
knowledge is possible in these conditions, but it is more capable of correcting
subjective semantic judgments than pragmatic judgments because the faculties of
human intelligence remain limited. As the economist descends the scale of
generalities, he is obliged to resort to a growing number of observations in order
to distinguish between the accidental and the essential character of phenomena. In
this sense, it is correct to affirm that only experience can tell us whether the results
obtained through an observation based on introspection (intuition) makes it possible
to better understand the behavior of this particular individual (Witt 1990, p. 44)
because the object of the research is a singular man.
Economics is not only a science of generality (Baconian induction); it is also a
social ontology that combines universals and defines abstract law by reasoning.
Social Ontology and Evolution
Thomism defines the axiom of action as a judgment, but analyzes the knowledge
problem with universal theory. This is criticized by the evolutionists and, in
particular, Hayek who thinks that "Aristotle was opposed to evolution of any kind"
(Hayek 1994, p. 45). Thomism does not account for historicity and changes
occurring over time.
Such criticism is incorrect, however, in that Aristotle is not hostile to evolution,
and pragmatic judgments are based on contingencies and history. Indeed, we have
just come to understand how the human mind discovers reality: it apprehends reality,
i.e., the only thing common to all things. "Beyond the diversities between beings,
there is only being which belongs to everyone" (Daujat 1974, p. 37). That common,
underlying reality is, in fact, stable. It is therefore unreasonable to claim that reality
is unknowable because the sense data are constantly changing (Moreau 1976, p. 8).
What comes first in the act of knowledge is the recognition of the identity of
something with itself. Each thing is what it is (the principle of identity) and a thing is
not what it is not (the principle of contradiction). To understand why the identity of a
thing does not negate change, it is important to introduce the distinction between the
actual and the potential (Aquinas 1961, p. 654). The actuality of a thing is the thing
as it exists. If only the actuality existed, there would be no change. The potential is a
thing as it could be, but is not yet. It is becoming. The potential of a thing, that
which it can be, marks the point of departure. Change comes neither from what
already is, nor from what is not, but from what is potential but not yet actualized
(Daujat 1974, p. 62).
For potency and actuality are referred in most cases to things in motion,
because motion is the actuality of a being in potency. But the principle aim of
this branch of science is to consider potency and actuality, not insofar as they
are found in mobile beings, but insofar as the[y] accompany being in general.
Hence potency and actuality are also found in immobile beings, for instance, in
intellectual ones. (Aquinas 1961, p. 654)
On this basis we can reconcile two facts: that the human being is not perceived as
an actor and that human rationality is an essence. History discovers human
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rationality (magic) and individualism (holism). The history of human societies does
not change the nature of human beings but increases the knowledge that men and
women have of themselves. Knowledge is not, pace hermeneutic philosophy, merely
"a history of problems" (Foucault). It is about familiarity with the particulars of time
and place, as they relate to universal categories. Thomist philosophy thus reconciles
the historicity of the categories of action with their universality.
Conclusion
Thomism creates a place for social ontology without denying the importance of
hypothetico-deductive economics, which is not only an instrument of forecast, as
argued by instrumentalism (Maki 1990, p. 331), but also a means of knowing the
qualitative relations between economic phenomena. Economics has an ontological
dimension that seeks to find the relationship between the essence of prices, money,
exchange, etc., in order to highlight economic universals, not just the quantitative
dimension of economic facts.
An explanation is not limited to forecasting and describing economic phenomena
in quantitative form (Maki 1990, pp. 331-335). Economic science consists in saying
what is, by describing the relations between the universals of economics and by
approaching as closely as possible the mysteries of the singular reality or action.
Austrian subjectivism would thus be prepared to position its reasoning on the highest
level of abstraction, taking the risk of universality and sacrificing the singularity of
specific and contingent situations. Consequently it links methodological subjectiv-
ism and ontological objectivism (Maki 1990, p. 295) and gives us the means to
rectify our beliefs. It is ontological objectivism that enables us to affirm that we can
have knowledge of economic phenomena that transcends our prejudices, opinions,
and preconceptions about the world.
Thomism also gives an epistemological foundation to support the "middle
ground" position (Garrison 1986; Kirzner 1992). Sustained by Thomas Aquinas's
philosophy, we may think that the Austrian-American School (like Bergson's
philosophy, which inspired it) has considerably underestimated the capabilities of the
human mind. For this reason, it is unable to understand how an individual knows the
future because it does not understand that he apprehends reality as a future (actual
and potential) via his knowledge of essences. Human beings can improve their
knowledge of the world and pre-coordinate their expectations by conceiving
coordination in a world where being is in the process of becoming, but incapable
of becoming contrary to its essence. We must reformulate Lachmann's thesis of the
unknowability of the future, insisting more on the diversity of judgments than on the
diversity of perceptions, to construct a theory of coordination that gives a place to
actors' ontological knowledge.
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